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Krysta Wise
Islamic Revolution of 1979:
The Downfall of American-Iranian Relations
In the broad scope of history, one year is merely a vapor.
Many single years are filled with “insignificant” people and events
that do not have great effects on global or domestic relations.
However, in some instances one year can mark a phenomenal
transformation from the past to the present. Such is the case with
Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979. Prior to this event, the United
States had excessive power over the Iranian government. This
western influence led to anti-American sentiment in Iran.1 Because
of unwanted American influence during the 1950s through the
1970s, the Islamic revolutionaries of 1979 not only resented western
customs, but also American foreign diplomacy. Thus, they halted
Iran’s peaceable relations with the United States of America.
US-Iran Relations, 1953-1979
Before the Iranian Revolution, the U.S. had gained extensive
control over Iran by propelling Mohammad Reza Shah to a
hegemonic power over Mohammad Mossadegh, a charismatic
Iranian Premier.2 Mossadegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company in 1951, a company that Britain received billions of dollars
from per year.3 Nationalization enraged Britain’s leaders who then
placed an embargo on Iran, impairing its economy. The U.S. was
afraid Iran would fall to communism, which was considered a
threat because of the ongoing cold war between America and the
Soviet Union. British pressure and the fear of a communist takeover
resulted in U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower authorizing a coup
to remove Mossadegh. In 1953, British Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS) and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) staged a
successful coup, known as Operation Ajax, removing Mossadegh
from power. Once he was gone, they strengthened the power of
the Shah and replaced Mossadegh with a U.S. supported Iranian
general, Fazlollah Zahedi. Thus, Britain and America established
an Iranian government that they could control.4
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In the post-coup era, American-Iranian relations flourished.
These good terms were not created by the Iranian masses’
contentment with the U.S., but from the Shah’s relationship with
America. Once the Shah’s power had been restored by Britain and
the U.S., these countries felt they had the right to direct his actions,
which in turn controlled Iran. The U.S. propelled the Shah, who was
also known as the “American puppet,” into a domineering leader
over the Iranian government and masses.5 As a result, Iranian
government officials and the public grew weary and developed
hatred toward not only the Shah, but also toward the U.S.6
Mohammad Reza Shah led an extremely repressive regime,
which was maintained by the Iranian National Intelligence and
Security Organization (SAVAK). This organization, which was
created and endorsed by the U.S., and employed 30,000 Iranians,
5,000 of which tortured, arrested, and killed thousands of the
Shah’s opponents.7 Because of the Shah’s dictatorial status, the
political policies and mass opinion were not aligned. For example,
most Iranians held anti-Israeli sentiments, but Iran was an ally to
Israel because the U.S. maintained peaceful ties with Israel.8 In the
1960s, inflation paralyzed Iran’s economy. The majority of wealth
was held by families that were somehow linked to the oil industry
or the Shah. These families were few in number, whereas the mass
population was poor.9 The Shah reaped the benefits of oil wealth
because of his deals with Britain and America. Therefore, he did not
sympathize with his hurting nation.
Another aspect of the Shah’s political agenda that did not
coincide with the will of the people was the modernization of Iran
through secularization. This agenda was primarily carried out with
the unsuccessful American-inspired “White Revolution,” which
consisted of six parts: land reform, sale of government-owned
factories to finance land reform, a new election law including
women’s suffrage, the nationalization of forests, a national literacy
campaign, and a plan to give workers a share of industrial profits.
Because of America’s “paranoia” toward Islam, U.S. leaders have
often approved of secular reforms such as this one in countries like
Iran. U.S. leaders wanted this plan to succeed because it would help
the Shah present images of liberalism and progressivism, which
would in turn possibly make him more popular.10
Not only did the U.S. empower the Shah to reform and maintain
his country by force, but it also helped him build and sustain his
army. A series of American presidents passed bills and endorsed
diplomatic measures that ensured peaceful relations with the
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Shah. In turn, Mohammad Reza complied with American wishes
and forced legislation through parliament that would appease
Washington. In 1964, the Majles, which contained the Shah’s chosen
parliament members, approved a plan for a $200 million loan
from the U.S. to purchase military supplies and equipment. Shah
oppositionists across the globe saw this agreement as a symbol
of bondage to the U.S.11 The Shah, with U.S. aid, continued the
advancement of his military. In 1971, American President Richard
Nixon and his cabinet approved a plan for Mohammad Reza to
purchase unlimited amounts of the best military equipment of
the time with the exception of nuclear weapons. President Gerald
Ford continued to shower Iran with military aid from 1974-1977.
Consequently, by 1978, Iran had the most highly advanced, besttrained military in the Persian Gulf area. It had the fourth-largest
air force and fifth-largest military on the globe. Iran’s military
spending went from $293 million in 1963 to $7.3 billion in 1977.12
Their forces were a reflection of the American military. The Iranian
Air Force spoke fluent English; military pay was often based on
how well soldiers spoke English.13
During Jimmy Carter’s first year as the American president, he
hosted the Shah in the U.S. for the entire world to see his commitment
to Mohammad Reza. According to the New York Times, Carter
praised the Shah for upholding a “strong, stable, and progressive
Iran.”14 However, during the Shah’s reign, American foreign policy
contradicted itself. U.S. leaders prided themselves on their abilities
to intervene in global situations in the name of democracy and
human rights. Yet at the same time, the U.S. endorsed, aided, and
praised the Iranian government, which did not even remotely
resemble democracy or a ground for human rights.15
Opposition to the Shah in the 1960s: Ayatollah Khomeini
Because the United States aided, endorsed, and praised the
Shah’s repressive regime, he remained in control for thirty-eight
year. During this time, government opposition groups developed
frequently. Most of these movements were crushed by the Shah;
however, one fierce revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Moosavi Khomeini, rose above the restraints placed by the
American-approved Shah.16
Khomeini, an Islamic fundamentalist, was educated in Qom,
which is the primary center for Shi’a scholarship in the world.17
He opposed the Shah’s regime for two major reasons: American
influence and the secularization of Iranian society.18 Khomeini
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believed Israel was a center for western imperialism—primarily
maintained by the U.S., and that Israel persecuted Muslims.
Therefore, he believed that Israelis and Americans were in a
war against Islam.19 In 1962, under pressure from the Kennedy
administration, the Shah issued a new election bill that allowed nonMuslims to be political candidates.20 Khomeini capitalized on this
legislation as his excuse to “save” Iran from the government threat
to the Islamic world. Another 1962 action that enraged Khomeini
was the fact that Shah had given Americans in Iran protection
from prosecution in Iranian courts. According to Khomeini, this
legislation was a prime example of American influence that was
corrupting Iran21:
If any of them commits a crime in Iran, they are
immune. If an American servant or cook terrorizes
your source of religious authority in the middle of
the bazaar, the Iranian police does not have the right
to stop him. The Iranian courts cannot put him on
trial or interrogate him. He should go to America
where the masters would decide what to do. . . .
We do not consider this government a government.
These are traitors. They are traitors to the country.22
Because of his criticism of the Shah, Khomeini was jailed for
two months in 1962. But Khomeini’s imprisonment did not stop
him from attacking “America’s puppet.” Thus, in 1964, the Shah
exiled Khomeini.23 From Iraq, Khomeini eventually sparked an
Islamic revolution in Iran that would alter this country forever.
Economic decline and revolutionary turmoil in the 1970s
Even though the peak of the revolution was in 1979, key
preliminary events occurred throughout the mid 1970s. During
this era, Iran experienced a harsh economic downturn, urban
overcrowding, monetary inflation, corrupt electoral processes and
leaders, and a large gap in the distribution of wealth.24 Because of
the growing discontentment in Iran, three main revolutionary factions
spoke out in opposition to the Shah: women, students, and religious
reformers. The main of goal of Iranian women was to overthrow the
Shah’s repressive regime. Revolutionary women engaged in protests
and guerrilla activities to undermine Mohammad Reza’s authority.25
Along with women’s groups, university students, domestic and
abroad, participated in revolutionary activities as well. The largest
student organization was the Confederation of Iranian Students.
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These students held diverse political ideologies, but the majority
of students belonged to two factions, the religious left or Marxism.
They had many grievances against Mohammad Reza: low college
acceptance rates, poor university education, insufficient housing
and conditions, and political dissatisfaction. Consequently, there
were many student-led protests and uprisings in university cities
such as Tehran.26 Many Iranians were killed while the Shah’s
military tried to suppress the crowds. Since Iranian cities were in
such turmoil, the Shah banned public gatherings in a desperate
attempt to stop the crisis. This act resulted in hundreds of thousands
of rebels protesting in Tehran and surrounding cities because of the
widespread disapproval of the ban.27
Revolutionaries from women and student organizations
merged with the revolutionary religious opposition, which was led
by Khomeini. Once this oppositional group became the leaders in
the revolution, it housed many groups of Iranians: middle-class,
former elderly of the National Front, workers, and guerillas. The
revolutionaries wished to remove Mohammad Reza from power
and establish a government that would benefit the Iranian public
and Islam, not a shah.28 Thus, Khomeini promised that he and the
religious reformers would not rule Iran directly.29 According to
Khomeini, the government had four key jobs: enforce Muslim Law,
destroy corruption and establish rights for the oppressed, eradicate
laws that had been created by false governments, and prevent
foreign nations from intervening in Islamic societies.30
The extensive pressure of Khomeini’s movement placed Iran
into a state of chaos. Since Iran was in extreme turmoil, the Shah
declared martial law in Tehran and eleven other cities. During this
period, the Shah’s military continued to kill Iranians. On November
3, 1978, Khomeini stated, “The Shah must go.”31 Because of continual
protests and strikes, Iran was paralyzed. Most businesses were
closed: stores, media sources, banks, and many oil industries.32
Iran’s oil production decreased to the lowest rate seen in twentyseven years. On December 29, 1978, Mohammad Reza consented to
temporarily leave the country.33
The U.S. response: January 1979
Throughout the 1978 commotion in Iran, America continued
to support the Shah with military aid and equipment to keep him
in power. The U.S. opposed Khomeini for many different reasons.
First of all, if Khomeini came to power, he would limit or eradicate
western influence in Iranian policies and relations because this
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promise was one of his primary platforms.34 This Iranian-U.S.
relationship would be drastically different from the American
relationship with the Shah. The U.S. was also concerned with a
change in economic relations, mainly in regards to oil, if Iran fell
to the revolutionaries. American leaders feared price increases
and a lack of oil availability. Another reason the U.S. opposed
a Khomeinian government was because the Communist party
(Tudeh) in Iran supported the revolutionary movement. Tudeh had
been banned by Mohammad Reza, but members were willing to
work with Khomeini if he established a new Iranian government.35
The U.S. saw this communist party as a potential threat that might
spread the Soviet sphere of influence. Therefore, American leaders
considered it their “duty” to contain Soviet influence and maintain
control over Iran.36
During 1978 and early 1979, the U.S. State Department
continually sent messages of support to Mohammad Reza. On
January 4, 1979, the U.S. sent General Robert E. Huyser, Commander
in Chief of the U.S.-European Command, to Iran. This joint military
force was directed by the United States. The purpose of Huyser’s
four-week mission was to stabilize the Iranian military and
encourage the Iranian military to support the Shah’s government.
The U.S. carefully chose Huyser for this mission because the Shah
was in desperate need of reestablishing control over his country.
Huyser was chosen for many reasons: he was a friend of the Shah,
he had previously worked to strengthen the Iranian military, and
he had been the overseer of the U.S. weaponry sales to Iran.37
After arriving in Iran, Huyser set up daily direct communication
with the Secretary of State’s office and occasionally the White
House.38 Huyser spent every day but one in meetings with the
Shah, Iranian senior military advisors, and Ambassador Zahedi.
Huyser declared American support for Iranian military action
that would hopefully stabilize the government.39 In the event
the government crumbled and chaos ensued during his mission,
he was required to aid the military in reinstating order. During
his visit, the U.S. supplied the Iranian military with clothing
and equipment. The revolutionaries continued to spread chaos
among Iranian cities. Toward the end of Huyser’s mission, he
realized that Mohammad Reza Shah’s government would fail
and Khomeini’s forces would take over Iran. As a result, Huyser,
who feared for his safety, returned to Washington and advised
U.S. leaders to positively communicate with Khomeini.40 Along
with Huyser, Henry Precht, Department of State desk officer in
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Iran, urged Carter and his cabinet to establish peaceful relations
with Khomeini’s forces. Precht felt that eventually Khomeini’s
radicalism would subside and his forces would enact moderate
institutions and policies. Ambassador William Sullivan also
sided with Huyser and Precht; however, Carter and his advisers
continued to oppose Khomeini.41
On January 16, 1979, the Shah and his family left Iran; 4.5 million
Iranian citizens flooded the city streets in celebration. On January
27, several million anti-government demonstrators marched
throughout Iran in support for Khomeini and denounced the Shah.
When Khomeini announced his return to Iran, a senior diplomat
from America was beaten by a mob of revolutionaries. As a result,
U.S. leaders urged American citizens in Iran to leave the country or
remain in safety zones. On January 31, Khomeini returned to Iran
after almost fifteen years of exile; on February 12, he officially took
power.42
Deterioration of US-Iran Relations
The Islamic Revolution led to ideological changes in Iran. Not
only did Khomeini remain in power, but he and his Shiite clerics
also ruled directly, which was not his original promise. They based
their rule on divine right and ran Iran by their interpretation
of Muslim law. The main principles of the clerical rule were
military intervention for political problems, Iranian unity, the
acknowledgment of selfish motives of foreign nations, and a goal
of Iranian progress.43 Khomeini and Iranian leaders identified the
U.S. as a nation with selfish motives. Thus, after the conclusion
of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, American-Iranian relations went
downhill. Khomeini knew that the U.S. had opposed his revolution.
Therefore, he ardently opposed most positive relations with
America. Khomeini accused the U.S. of exploiting Iran’s resources
and money. He claimed that because of U.S. exploitation, Iranians
were forced to engage in a revolution where Iranian blood was
shed. He was willing to take economic risks in order to destroy
western influence in Iran. Because of Khomeini’s radical views,
many U.S. leaders assumed that the passion of revolution would
decrease and moderate reformers would rise to power. However,
this scenario never occurred.44
When Khomeini was first establishing his government, U.S.
officials concluded that they should attempt positive diplomatic
measures toward him in order to prevent the Soviet Union from
influencing or taking over Iran. Khomeini, however, wanted Iran
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to engage in isolationism and did not wish to strengthen ties with
America. In fact, he gave fiery anti-American speeches to allies and
the Iranian media. In May of 1979, the U.S. Congress passed decrees
that criticized the Iranian government for its current actions. As a
result, masses of Anti-American protesters and media showed their
discontent with the United States. The U.S. proposed a nominee for
an ambassador to be sent to Iran, but Iran declined the nominee.45
According to Khomeini, “All the problems of the East stem from
those foreigners from the west, and from America at the moment.
All our problems come from America.”46 Since Khomeini believed
that the U.S. was to blame for the Iranian problems and revolution,
the remaining part of 1979 was a pivotal shift in AmericanIranian relations. Attitudes and actions between these two nations
continually got worse.47 This declining relationship was best proven
through six major events in 1979: the removal of U.S. “containment,”
the alteration of oil policies, a change in U.S.-Iranian arms sale
agreement, U.S. disapproval for Iran’s “lack” of human rights, the
Iranian hostage crisis, and the U.S. embargo on Iran.48
“Containment”
Prior to the Islamic revolution, Iran was an ally against
communism, which was the key “evil” of America’s cold war enemy,
the Soviet Union. After the Islamic revolution, Khomeini removed
Iran from the American sphere of influence. Unlike Mohammad
Reza, Khomeini initially allowed the Tudeh party to exist. Not only
did he allow this pro-Moscow party to re-emerge in Iran, but he also
took measures that benefitted the Soviet Union. Iran was a strategic
place for the U.S. to gather intelligence on the Soviets. A result of the
Islamic revolution was the decline of American intelligence seeking
in Iran. After Khomeini took over the government, he closed two
American operated intelligence collection centers. One adjoined
the border of the Soviet Union near Bandar Shah. The other was in
an isolated location in Kabkam. Because Khomeini shut down these
facilities, U.S. leaders were not able to spy on the Soviet nuclear
and missile testing site in Soviet Central Asia. During this shift in
Iran’s foreign political policies, Soviet leaders gained important
information on U.S. military advancements that they might not
have otherwise learned about. For example, Soviet leaders obtained
booklets and visuals of the F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft, and samples
of the A1M-54A Phoenix air-to-air missile and the Hawk antiaircraft missile. At this point in history, America’s primary concern
was with the Soviet Union. Thus, Khomeini’s actions to prohibit the
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U.S. from gathering information on the Soviets and allowing key
information to get into Soviet hands were huge blows to American
officials and intelligence officers. These moves caused anxiety and
anger among U.S. leaders.49
Oil policy
In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, America not only
feared the spread of communist sympathizers, but also what would
come of the oil industry in Iran. Khomeini declined any western
influence. Thus, no western countries would be able to control or
even manipulate the running of this industry. These concerns proved
to be correct because the Iranian revolution resulted in the curbing
of one-fifth of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’
(OPEC) production capability. This Iranian oil cutoff strained
the oil market immediately.50 American media automatically
began speculating on how high oil prices would rise because of
Iran’s policies.51 The U.S. bought approximately 200 million fewer
barrels of oil during 1979.52 By December, world oil prices were
approximately fifty percent higher than when Iran first cut back
the oil supply. U.S. oil refining companies paid nearly thirty dollars
per barrel for OPEC’s crude oil. This price was double what it had
been one year prior and approximately ten times the price that was
paid in 1970. These new oil policies marked an economic shift for
both Iran and the U.S. Iran began reaping more profits from its oil
industry; America was required to pay more for foreign oil. As a
result, American leaders attempted to decrease reliance on foreign
oil and conserve energy more efficiently.53
Arms sales
Along with curtailing the oil capacity, Khomeini also tried to
hurt the U.S. economy by cancelling the U.S. sale of arms to Iran.
This transfer of arms from the U.S. to Iran had taken place for many
decades while the Shah was in power. It resulted in billions of
dollars that boosted the U.S. economy. However, Khomeini wanted
to sever Iranian reliance on America. In 1979, he officially cancelled
seven billion dollars worth of U.S. arms purchases. Khomeini’s
actions mark an extreme change in economic policies between
the two countries.54 U.S. arms sales to Iran peaked in 1978 during
Mohammad Reza’s reign at $4,500,000,000. The following year, it
dropped to zero and the exchange remained very low throughout
the 1980s.55 The U.S. had to find new buyers for the arms to prevent
the U.S. economy from weakening.56
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Human Rights
Throughout 1979, U.S.-Iranian relations continued to spiral
downward. Previously, U.S. leaders had supported the Shah’s
repressive actions because they kept him in power. However, after
the Islamic revolution, the U.S. repealed its support for such activities.
Not only did American leaders remove their support, but they
actually criticized Khomeini and his government officials for acts that
Americans deemed inhumane. For example, when Khomeini’s men
started executions for oppositionists, the U.S. Senate unanimously
supported a resolution of condemnation for these actions. Americans
leaders also expressed discontent toward Khomeini and the Islamic
clerical rulers for sentencing Mohammad Reza to death. These U.S.
reactions further prove that America had endorsed the Shah far more
than it would ever support the new Islamic government.57
The Hostage Crisis
These souring relations between Iran and the U.S. culminated
at the end of 1979. On November 4, Iranians seized the American
embassy in Tehran and took nearly seventy U.S. citizens captive.58
This act was a response to American President Jimmy Carter
admitting Reza Shah into the U.S. for cancer treatment. This hostage
crisis lasted 444 days and tainted Carter’s presidency. Khomeini’s
support was the main reason this crisis lasted so long. He endorsed
the act against the U.S. for four reasons. First of all, he and his clerics
believed that America was trying to bring down his regime through
the U.S. embassy in Tehran. Khomeini backed the hostage situation
because he felt it would hinder amends being made between the
United States and Iran.59 According to one contemporary observer,
“since American opposition to the Islamic revolution was deemed
to be an immutable fact, any easing of relations by Iranian leaders
would show them to be traitors to the cause.”60 Khomeini and his
men also believed the moderate reformers were attempting to
liberalize the government. By storming the embassy, the clerics
could eliminate the moderate political forces and create an impasse
between the U.S. and Iran. Although Jimmy Carter made efforts
to make peace with Iran in 1979, Khomeini continued to allow
the militants to hold the Americans because it showed Iran’s
“independence and opposition to American power.”61 Khomeini’s
first proposal of peace required the U.S. to apologize for past
exploitation, hand over the Shah, and return his money. However,
American leaders declined this offer.62
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In 1980, Carter made two attempts at reconciliation and a
rescue mission, but all failed. As the crisis continued, Khomeini
made a second offer for reconciliation: the U.S. had to give back
Iran’s frozen assets and the royal family’s wealth, declare that
America would not intervene in Iranian affairs, and drop law suits
filed against Iran. The U.S. declined this offer. In September of
1980, Iraq invaded Iran. Khomeini blamed the United States for this
invasion even though the U.S. claimed to be neutral in the conflict.63
On a radio broadcast, Mohammad Musavi Kho’ini, a member of
the Majles hostage committee said, “How can one meet a criminal
who for long years exploited our Muslim nation and imposed the
Pahlavi dictatorship on it? As for now, the United States is actually
in a state of war with us.”64
Khomeini continued his hardnosed policies toward the U.S.
In December of 1980, he made a third proposal to end the crisis.
Its conditions were steep: America would have to give Iran $24
billion dollars in place of its frozen assets and royal family’s
money. The U.S. refused and this crisis hurt Carter’s campaign
for reelection. On January 20, 1981, Carter left office and an
agreement was reached; the hostages were freed. The terms of this
agreement were that the U.S. returned $11 billion of Iran’s frozen
assets, American leaders declared they would not intervene in
Iran’s affairs, the royal family’s money would be frozen, and Iran
would be permitted to attempt to regain this wealth through the
U.S. court system. Most of the money Iran received from this crisis
was used to pay off debt owed to the U.S. This crisis deepened the
rift between the two countries. Americans were upset at how the
hostages were mistreated and Khomeini’s followers reinforced
their anti-American sentiment.65
U.S. Embargo
During the hostage crisis in 1980, the United States severed
political relations with Iran. Carter passed Executive Order No.
12170, which stated
I hereby order blocked all property and interests
in property of the Government of Iran, its
instrumentalities and controlled entities and the
Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States or which are in
or come within the possession of control of persons
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.66
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The Islamic revolution’s immediate effects on U.S.-Iranian
relations foreshadowed diplomacy between the two nations for
the next few decades. Every American president since Carter has
continued this trade embargo on Iran.67
Conclusion
Along with the trade embargo, bad American-Iranian relations
have continued since the revolution and its aftermath. Many
instances illustrate this downturn. In 1983, Khomeini supported
Shi’a Muslims who bombed western embassies in Kuwait.
Throughout the late 1980s, Iranians expressed their anti-American
sentiment through rioting and propaganda. In 1996, Iranian leaders
helped train supply men for the bombardment of the U.S. military
housing facility in Saudi Arabia. This attack resulted in nineteen
dead and over 500 wounded, 240 of whom were American military
staff. In the new millennium, the U.S. and other leading United
Nations (U.N.) actors have been trying to explore Iran’s nuclear
program because Iran will not provide the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) a statement or design on their program.68
Today, the U.S. and Iran exchange ambassadors, but diplomacy
between the two is not as smooth as it was during Mohammad
Reza’s era. American presidents and legislation still forbid almost
all trade with Iran. President Barack Obama not only continued
the embargo against Iran, but also enacted individual sanctions on
certain Iranians.69 According to U.S. officials, these trade restrictions
are meant to harm not the Iranian public, but the Iranian leaders
because of their failure to comply with certain standards: Iran
will not withdraw its sponsorship of terrorism, recognize Israel’s
independence, raise human rights standards, or reveal substantial
information on its nuclear program.70
In the historical realm of U.S.-Iranian relations, many years are
important. However, 1979 marks the greatest change in diplomatic
and economic exchanges between these two nations. Khomeini’s
rise to power halted good relations. Not only did he remove
American influence from Iran, but he also supported, endorsed,
and praised any anti-American sentiment, protests, or terrorist
acts. This standpoint is very contrary to Iran’s previous leader,
Mohammad Reza. Khomeini’s anti-Americanism was proven many
times throughout his term; he removed Iran from the American
sphere of “containment,” he reduced the amount of oil sold to the
U.S., cancelled the U.S. arms purchase agreement, and approved
the Iranian hostage crisis. His legacy has remained evident in
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the leaders that followed him. In response to Iran’s policies and
actions, the U.S. has participated in a continuing embargo against
Iran. These sanctions have affected Iranian politics and economic
system.71 Only time will tell just how long the 1979 Islamic
revolution’s impact will be seen in U.S.-Iranian relations.
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